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*

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

State v. Sampson, Case No, 890327-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
This letter is to provide supplemental authority,
pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for
the State's position on an issue which was raised by the Court in
the oral argument in the above-entitled case. The issue was
whether a second set of Miranda warnings could serve to clarify
an equivocal reference to counsel under State v. Griffin, 754
P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Delaware Supreme Court
answered this question in the affirmative in Crawford v. State,
580 A.2d 571 (Del.Supr. 1990); a copy of that case is attached.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
v4r ' £ w

i-iz^

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
CB/pa
cc Richard G. Uday
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Family Court for a de novo hearing, on the
merits, before a different Judge.
(O
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Steven D. CRAWFORD, Defendant
Below, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff
Below, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: June 19, 1990.
Decided: Sept. 21, 1990.
Defendant was convicted of murder in
first degree, first-degree arson and possession of deadly weapon during commission
of felony in the Superior Court, New Castle
County, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Walsh, J., held that defendant's attempted invocation of his right to
counsel was ambiguous and did not bar
further questioning following police attempts at clarification.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <®=>412.2(4)
Where suspect has made explicit request for assistance of counsel, no further
questioning by police may occur until counsel is provided or suspect himself initiates
further conversation. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 5.
2. Criminal Law 0=412.2(4)
In determining whether statements
made by suspect to police are admissible,
court must determine whether suspect actually invoked his right to counsel prior to
making statements, and if so, statements
by suspect are admissible only if suspect
initiated further discussion and suspect
knowingly and intelligently waived right to
have attorney present U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 5.

3. Criminal Law <$=»412.2(4)
In order for defendant to rely upon
Miranda's bar against further police questioning, it must be shown that request for
counsel has been effectively conveyed to
interrogating officers. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 5.
4. Criminal Law <3=>412.2(4)
Defendant did not unequivocally request assistance of counsel but rather ambiguously invoked his right prior to questioning by police; although defendant indicated that he was looking for attorney, he
did not indicate that he would deal with
police only through counsel, and further
testified at suppression hearing that he intended to deal directly with police in effort
to persuade them that he was not involved
in crime under investigation. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.
5. Criminal Law <®=>412.2(4)
Per se rule requiring complete cessation of questioning of defendant by police
upon equivocal request for counsel places
burden of perceptual clarity entirely on police. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
6. Criminal Law <3=>412.2(4)
Threshold standard used to determine
whether statements made by defendant to
police after ambiguously invoking right to
counsel looks to totality of circumstances
surrounding ambiguous invocation in
search for intent with heavy burden of
clarity upon * defendant. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 5.
7. Criminal Law <s=>412.2(4)
When utilizing clarification approach in
determining whether statements made by
defendant to police after ambiguously invoking right to counsel are admissible, interrogating officer must limit questions to
those designed to elicit definitive indications of intent when suspect makes such
request for counsel. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 5.
8. Criminal Law <3=»412.2(4)
When defendant has ambiguously invoked right to counsel prior to questioning
by police, police should utilize clarification
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approach to attempt to determine suspect's
intention; if clarifying questions or repeated Miranda warnings indicate that
suspect does not wish assistance of counsel, interrogation may continue. U.S.C.A.
Const Amend. 5.
9. Criminal Law $»U2.2<4)
Police acted in good faith m use of
repeated Miranda warnings in effort to
clarify defendant's intentions to invoke
right to counsel prior to questioning and
thus, statements made following warnings
were admissible in murder trial; while defendant's precustodial conduct suggested
that he wanted to confer with attorney, at
no time while in police custody did he assert desire to consult with counsel before
questioning, even though he was aware
that his sister was continuing search for
attorney, U.S.C.A, Const.Amend. 5.
10, Criminal Law ^ 4 1 4
Suppression hearing testimony may be
used to determine defendant's subjective
intention to invoke right to counsel at time
of interrogation. U.S.C.A. Const Amend.
5.
Appeal from
FIRMED.

Superior

Court

AF

John R. Hiner, Jr. (argued) and Edward
C. Pankowski, Jr., Asst. Public Defenders,
Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington,
for appellant,
Gary A. Myers (argued), Deputy Ally.
Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for appellee.
Before MOORE, WALSH and
HOIJ^ND, JJ
WAIJSH, Justice;
This is an appeal by the defendant, Stephen D. Crawford ("Crawford"), from a
conviction in the Superior Court of murder
in the first degree, as well as related
charges of first degree arson and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Crawford contends
that the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress a statement made by him while in
police custody after he had invoked his

right to counsel, We conclude that Crawford's attempted invocation of his right to
counsel was, at best, ambiguous and did
not bar further questioning following police attempts at clarification. Finding no
error in the Superior Court ruling, we affirm the convictions.
I
The farts pertinent to the defendant's
allc)ralions of error are essentially undisputed On Saturday, January 30, 1988,
Marcella Stewart was found murdered iu
her apartment. She had suffered numerous injuries from a beating and stabbing,
The bed in which her body lay had been sel
on fire, presumably in an attempt to conceal her murder. Crawford, a former boj
friend of the victim, was a suspect m the
ensuing investigation. The police made
several attempts to locate Crawford in or
der to question him. During the period
from Saturday through Monday, the police
visited various locations and left business
cards with requests that the defendant con
tact them
On Tuesday, February 2, 1988, Crawford
telephoned the police and spoke with one of
the investigator, Officer Vietri. Vietri
tit-Led the defendant to come to the police
station for questioning In the course of
the conversation, there was some mention
of an attorney. According to Officer Vietri, the defendant asked whether he should
bring an attorney. Officer Vietri responded that the defendant would have to decide
that for himself. However, the defendant
testified that he indicated to the officer
that he was planning to contact an attorney
before presenting himself at the police sto
tion.
After his telephone call to the poliuj,
Crawford attempted to locate an attorney
With the aid of relatives, he visited one law
office and telephoned another, Unable to
retain counsel, the defendant proceeded to
the office of a third attorney who had
previously represented his sister. While en
route, the defendant was taken into custody by police officers, including Vietri, who
had secured a search warrant authorizing
them to secure handprints, hair samples
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and fingernail scrapings from the defendant
Officer Vietri advised the defendant of
his Miranda rights and asked if he was
willing to talk to the police. The defendant
answered that he understood his rights and
that he would be willing to talk. In response to Officer Vietri's subsequent question concerning his destination, the defendant responded, "I was looking for a lawyer." The defendant's concern about locating counsel was not relayed by Vietri to the
other officers responsible for confinement
or questioning.

generally exculpatory, consisting of explanations of his whereabouts at the time of
the murder. Through further investigation, the police were able to demonstrate
certain contradictions and inaccuracies in
the defendant's statements. This evidence
was presented at trial as proof of the defendant's guilt
II
Crawford contends that his active search
for an attorney constituted an unequivocal
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, and police questioning with knowledge of his effort contravened that right.
Alternatively, he argues that even if his
actions are deemed an ambiguous invocation, the failure of the police to clarify his
intentions renders subsequent statements
equally suppressible under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). To the contrary, the
State argues that the police proceeded
properly in the face of Crawford's ambiguous conduct.

Officer Vietri then turned the defendant
over to other officers, who transported the
defendant to the police station. While en
route, the defendant initiated a conversation with one of the transporting officers,
Officer Glose. Glose interrupted the defendant and read the Miranda rights a
second time. The transporting officers did
not interrogate the defendant, nor did they
attempt to pursue the conversation initiated by the defendant.
Upon arrival at the police station, the
defendant was handed over to the detecIn Miranda, the Supreme Court extendtives responsible for the investigation. De- ed the Fifth Amendment right to silence to
tective Tabor, who was unaware that the include a right to counsel during interrogadefendant had been attempting to find a tion. Id. 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Determining
lawyer when apprehended, advised the de- that custodial interrogation2 is fundamenfendant of his rights a third time. The tally coercive, the Court held that a dedefendant expressly agreed to talk to the tained suspect "must be clearly informed
officers without a lawyer present.1 Tabor that he has the right to consult with a
and another officer then interviewed the lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
defendant orally. When an attorney con- during interrogation . . . " Id. at 1626.
tacted by Crawford's sister arrived at the Failure to offer the assistance of counsel
police station and directed that the inter- during questioning was held to undermine
view stop, the police ceased further ques- the protection of the Fifth Amendment
tioning.
privilege against self-incrimination. ThereAlthough under detention for a body fore, the Court concluded that any evidence
search, the defendant was not placed under obtained in a custodial interrogation should
arrest. Furthermore, he was aware that be excluded where "procedural safeguards
when the body search was completed he effective to secure the privilege against
would be released. The statements made self-incrimination" were not utilized. Id. at
by the defendant during interrogation were 1612.
1. At the suppression hearing, the defendant's
testimony indicated that he intended to talk to
the police with or without counsel. Aware that
his sister was continuing the search for an attorney, the defendant testified that he decided,
nevertheless, to answer police questions.

2. Custodial interrogation was defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.M Id. at 1612.
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Id. at 1612. A second requirement was
also added: the right to counsel could only
be waived "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id, The broad language concerning invocation and the strict waiver
standard, on their face, appear to imply
that even an ambiguous invocation of the
right to counsel would require the cessation of questioning. However, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have significantly
eroded the expansive standards proposed
by the Miranda court.

In its most recent consideration of the
issue, the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093,100
L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), examined an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel that
was ignored because the subsequent questioning involved an unrelated crime. In
accord with previous decisions, the Roberson court held that the bright line rule set
out in Edwards and Miranda required that
all interrogation must cease after an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.
Moreover, the Court found this strict rule
to be applicable even if the questioning was
directed to a crime different from the one
related to the original invocation. Since
the State claimed that the second interrogator was unaware of the original request,
the Roberson court also held that subsequent interrogators have the burden of determining whether the right to counsel has
been invoked.

A.

B.

The Miranda court also attempted to
define the standard by which invocations of
the right to counsel should be evaluated.
The Court held:
If, however, [a suspect] indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning.

[1,2] Where a suspect has made an explicit request for the assistance of counsel,
the duty imposed upon the police is clear:
no further questioning may occur until
counsel is provided or the suspect himself
initiates further conversation. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68
L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).3 In Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488
(1984), the Court refined this standard by
setting forth a two step inquiry. First, the
court must determine whether the defendant actually invoked his right to counsel.
Once this determination is made, further
statements by the defendant are admissible
only if (a) the defendant initiated further
discussion, and (b) the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived the right to have
an attorney present. Id. 105 S.Ct at 493.
This Court has applied this analysis in situations in which the invocation is concededly
present. See Wainwright v. State, Del.
Supr., 504 A.2d 1096 (1986); see also
Brank v. State, Del.Supr., 528 A.2d 1185,
1187 (1987).
3. Explicit direction from an attorney to the police not to question a client without the presence of counsel is equally effective to bar ques-

Although it has not specifically addressed the question of an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the Supreme
Court has considered related issues on several occasions. Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182
(1974) (since the procedural rules of Miranda were not themselves rights protected by the constitution, strict adherence to
the form suggested in Miranda was not
constitutionally required, thus failure of interrogating officers to advise suspect of
right to appointed counsel did not invalidate an otherwise voluntary statement);
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99
S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (the defendant refused to sign a written waiver
form, but orally agreed to make a statement. The defendant's actions and words
were held to be sufficient to indicate that
he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
rights); Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707,
99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (a per
se invocation rule is limited to explicit requests for an attorney).
tioning. Bryan v. State, DeLSupr., 571 A.2d 170
(1990).
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|;j, IJ In order for a defendant to rely
upon Miranda *s bar against further questioning, it must be shown that a request for
counsel has been effectively conveyed to
the interrogating officers. In Alston ?;.
State, DeLSupr., 554 A.2d 304 (1989), we
rejected a defendant's pro forma invocation which was never communicated to persons actually conducting the questioning.
We there ruled that a prior latent desire to
communicate with counsel will not override
clear expressions during a custodial Interrogation of a willingness to respond.
Here, although the police were aware that
Crawford was seeking counsel, he had not
yet contacted an attorney at the time the
search warrant was executed. The police
were not required to defer execution of the
warrant until Crawford succeeded in his
search for an attorney, since the reading of
his Miranda rights served to protect Crawford from any forced questioning during
the execution of the search warrant. At no
time did Crawford indicate that he would
deal with the police only through counsel.
Indeed, his suppression hearing testimony
makes clear his intention of dealing directly
with the police in an effort to persuade
them that he was not involved in the crime
under investigation.
Given the ambivalent nature of Craw
ford's conduct—his searching for an attor
ney but initiation of discussion with police
after the initial Miranda warning—we do
not view his actions as reflecting an unequivocal request for the assistance of
counsel but rather a mixed or ambiguous
invocation of that right. We thus are required to determine the manner in which
the police may respond to a suspect's ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel.
Ill
In Smith v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
outlined the three approaches to ambiguous requests for an attorney:
Some courts have held that all questioning must cease upon any request for or
reference to counsel, however equivocal
or ambiguous..
Others have attempted to define a threshold standard of clarity for such requests, and have held that

requests falling below this threshold do
not trigger the right to counsel
Still
others have adopted a third approach,
holding that when an accused makes an
equivocal statement that 'arguably' can
be construed as a request for counsel, all
interrogations must immediately cease
except for narrow questions designed to
'clarify' the earlier statement of the accused desires respecting counsel
105 S.Ct. at 493 n. 3 (citations omitted).
These standards vary in the degree to
which the burden of clarity is placed on the
defendant
[5] The per se rule requiring complete
cessation of questioning upon an equivocal
request for counsel defers to the "in any
manner" language of Miranda, and places
the burden of perceptual clarity entirely on
the police. The leading case adopting this
approach, Maglio v. Jago, 6th Cir., 580 F.2d
202 (1978), held that the statement, "maybe
I should have an attorney" was an equivocal request for counsel. Relying on the
specific Miranda "in any manner" language, the Maglio court found the ambiguous state of the defendant's mind as evidenced by his statement was sufficient to
invoke the right to counsel, and that all
further interrogation should have ceased.
[6] The threshold standard looks to the
totality of circumstances surrounding the
ambiguous invocation in a search for intent
with a heavy burden of clarity upon the
defendant. See e.g. United States v. Gordon, 2d Cir., 655 F.2d 478 (1981) (statements made after unsuccessful attempt to
contact attorney and re-reading of rights
form were admissible in view of defendant's sophistication and cautious behavior).
[7] The clarification approach requires
the interrogating officer to limit his questions to those designed to elicit definitive
indications of intent when a suspect makes
an ambiguous request for counsel. In
Thompson v. Wainwright, 5th Cir., 601
F.2d 768 (1979), the court ruled that after
an equivocal request for counsel, the scope
of a custodial interrogation should be "immediately narrowed to one subject and one
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only. Further questioning
thereafter admissability of a confession given after a
must be limited to clarifying that request defendant had informed the police that she
until it is clarified." Id. at 771 (emphasis had sought legal counsel but found it too
in original). The court also determined expensive to have counsel accompany her
that subsequent questions leading to re- to interrogation. The agents gave her Misponses without the presence of counsel randa warnings after explaining to her the
failed to clarify the suspect's statement booking process, and Gonzalez then gave a
that he desired to tell his story to an attor- confession. The Gonzalez court held that
ney first.
"[a]ny ambiguity in Gonzalez's statement
about
her inability to retain counsel was
In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had
resolved
by her failure to request counsel
examined an interrogator's discussion of
or
the
presence
of counsel after receiving
the suspect's options regarding the right to
the
Miranda
warning
and proceeding with
counsel after the suspect ambiguously indiher
confession."
Id.
at
1466.
cated he wished to consult an attorney. In
Nash v. Estelle, 5th Cir., 597 F.2d 513
In comparison, the Eleventh Circuit later,
(1979), the court-held that the interroga- in Towne v. Bugger, 11th Cir., 899 F.2d
tor's subsequent discussion of the suspect's 1104 (1990), held that the clarification test
right to counsel, which included the option
was not satisfied where accusatory stateof complete cessation of questioning until
ments and repetition of the Miranda rights
an attorney was provided, was sufficiently
was the interrogator's response to the sus
narrow not to infringe upon, the defenpect's question concerning the need for
dant's Miranda rights.
counsel. Analogizing to United States v.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cherry, 5th Cir., 733 F.2d 1124 (1984) and
Fouche, 9th Cir., 833 F.2d 1284 (1987) (en United States v. Fouche, supra, the
banc), was required to determine whether a Tovone court observed:
second reading to the suspect of his Miin both cases, as in the present case, the
randa rights could operate as a clarificainterrogating officer was asked by the
tion. Recognizing that "a rote repetition
defendant for advice as to whether the
of the Miranda rights does not prove that
defendant should exercise his right to
a defendant understood and voluntarily
get an attorney. Such questions reveal
waived those rights," the Fouche court deto the interrogating officer that the determined that "Nash does not require a
fendant is contemplating exercising his
mechanical and talismanic repetition of the
right to have an attorney present, and
word 'lawyer' when the Miranda warnings
under the rule established in Nash and
have been given twice, in great detail, and
Thompson, the officer should clarify the
the suspect has understood his rights." Id.
defendant's wishes before preceding furat 1288-89. Because the agent's questions
ther.
"did not impinge on the exercise of the
suspect's continuing option to cut off the Id. at 1109. The Towne court held that
interview," the Fouche court held that the since an equivocal statement was made and
interrogation subsequent to the ambiguous there was no clarification or initiation, the
invocation was designed to clarify, and not confession was obtained in violation of the
to elicit incriminating information. Id. at defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The
1289 (quoting Nash, 597 F.2d at 518). Gonzalez decision was distinguished on the
Thus, the agent had refrained from further fact that the interrogators in Gonzalez, as
interrogation until he had determined that here, did not make accusatory statements
Fouche had knowingly and voluntarily in response to the ambiguity, and the right
to an appointed counsel was made clear by
waived his right to counsel.
the Miranda warning.
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
[8] In our view, the clarification apGonzalez, 11th Cir., 833 F.2d 1464 (1987),
faced an ambiguous request similar to the proach adopted by many Federal circuits
one in this case. The court considered the and embraced as well by the highest courts
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of several states 4 has much to recommend
it The per se rule which bars all statements simply because a suspect articulates,
in the most tentative and general fashion, a
desire to consult with counsel is too inflexible and ill serves the needs of reasonable
police investigation. We view the threshold test as merely establishing the context
or quantum of evidence which a court will
examine in the face of a right to counsel
claim. While Miranda imparts an affirmative duty to advise a suspect of the right to
counsel incident to a custodial interrogation, the right is subject to waiver simply
by proceeding to respond. Where a suspect does not unequivocally invoke that
right, the police should be entitled to attempt to determine the suspect's intention.
We thus endorse the clarification approach
which may include, as occurred here, the
repeating of Miranda warnings as a means
of emphasizing the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const, amend
VI; Del. Const, art. I, § 7. If, however,
the police make additional inquiries concerning a suspect's intentions, the clarifying questions may not coerce or intimidate
the suspect or otherwise discourage his
effort to secure counsel, if that is his intention. Nor may the police tender any legal
advice or attempt to dissuade the suspect
from pursuing an intended course. Repeated Miranda warnings may prove to be
of limited clarifying assistance in certain
situations but they at least serve the purpose of emphasizing the suspect's options
and placing the responsibility on the suspect to either continue the questioning or
remain silent until counsel is available. If
clarifying questions or repeated Miranda
warnings indicate that the suspect does not
wish the assistance of counsel, the interrogation may continue.
[9] In this case, Crawford's actions and
statements to the police conveyed mixed
signals concerning his willingness to speak
4. See State v. Lamp, Iowa Supr., 322 N.W.2d 48
(1982) (holding that phone calls to attorney coupled with reading of rights and waiver did not
invoke right to counsel since any ambiguity was
clarified); cf. Daniel v. State, Wyo.Supr., 644
P.2d 172, 177 (1982) (holding "If it is difficult
for the police officer to determine whether a
suspect indeed intends to invoke his right to

without the presence of counsel. When he
first broached the subject in his telephone
call to Officer Vietri, Crawford was advised
that he, himself, would have to decide
whether he needed an attorney. From the
time he was taken into custody he was
given his Miranda warnings on three separate occasions, on the second occasion in
response to the defendant's initiation of
discussion while being transported to the
police station. While the defendant's precustodial conduct suggested that he wanted to confer with an attorney, at no time
while in police custody did he assert a
desire to consult with counsel before questioning, even though he was aware that his
sister was continuing the search for an
attorney. At best, Crawford's actions reflected an interest in securing counsel prior
to custody but evidencing no unwillingness
to discuss the matter with the police while
in custody after thrice being advised of his
right to remain silent without the presence
of counsel. Under the circumstances, we
believe the police acted in good faith in the
use of the repeated Miranda warnings in
an effort to clarify Crawford's intentions.
His statements were thus clearly admissible in evidence at trial.
IV
In refusing to suppress Crawford's statements, the trial court noted that in Crawford's testimony he did not feel that he
needed counsel present before talking to
the police. Crawford now questions the
trial court's use of his suppression hearing
testimony in the determination that he did
not desire counsel during interrogation. In
effect, Crawford argues that any ambiguity in his invocation of the right to counsel should be resolved on the facts manifested at the time of the interrogation,
without consideration of his unarticulated
have an attorney present, the officer may seek
clarification of the suspect's desires, as long as
he does not disguise the clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or intimidation."); see also
Cannady v. State, Fla.Supr., 427 So.2d 723
(1983); Russell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 727 S.W.2d
573 (1987).
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intention revealed in the suppression hearing.
[10] The use of suppression hearing
testimony to determine a defendant's subjective intention at the time of interrogation is an acceptable practice. In Connecticut v. Barret, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828,
93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), the Supreme Court
considered contradictory statements concerning the desire to communicate with the
police without counsel. Although the Barret court found the defendant's statements
to be clear and unambiguous, in support of
that determination, the Court explicitly relied on the defendant's suppression hearing
testimony as to his subjective understanding of the Miranda warnings. See
id 107.S.Ct: at 832-33.

mised by the admission of post factum
statements of intent
We conclude that the defendant's invocation of his right to counsel were at best
equivocal and the police did not violate his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel in their
subsequent questioning of him. The trial
court correctly refused to suppress the disputed statements and the judgment of conviction is accordingly, affirmed.

In Delap v. Dugger, 11th Cir., 890 F.2d NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Delaware, and
285 (1989), the Court confronted the quesDepartment of Finance of New Castle
tion of the use of suppression testimony in
County, Appellants Below, Appellants,
an equivocal request context. The defendant had indicated to his interrogators that
v.
he was represented by counsel in an unThe HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF DELArelated matter. The court held that this
WARE, a nonprofit corporation orgaalone was not even an ambiguous invocanized under the laws of the State of
tion of the right to counsel. The defenDelaware; Board of Assessment Review
dant's suppression hearing testimony as to
of New Castle County; and Richard M.
his intent at the time of interrogation was
Lagergren, Mary D. Croze, Oliver F.
utilized by both the district court and on
Fonville, Harry A. Reynolds, and
appeal. Delap argued that the use of postGeorge B. Schreppler, Jr., Individually
request statements to clarify his initial
as Members of the Board of Assessment
statement was a violation of Smith v. IlliReview of New Castle County, Appelnois, supra. The Delap court held that
lees
Below, Appellees.
the purpose of the Smith prohibition on the
use of post-request statements to cast
Supreme Court of Delaware.
doubt on the initial request was to prevent
Submitted: July 17, 1990.
deliberate or unintentional overreaching by
Decided: Sept. 21, 1990.
the interrogating officers. Since the use of
the defendant's testimony for a contextual
assessment at trial did not implicate the
County board of assessment deterconcerns of Smith, its admission was
mined that building, which was rented to
deemed acceptable.
private law firm and which was part of
We view the trial court's use of Craw- complex of buildings owned by historical
ford's testimony concerning his intent at society, was exempt from county taxation.
the time of the questioning as appropriate County sought judicial review. The Superiand not inconsistent with the holding in or Court, New Castle County, upheld the
Smith v. Illinois. Moreover, there is no board of assessment ruling. County aplogical reason to exclude Crawford's testi- pealed. The Supreme Court, Jacobs, Vice
mony, since the objective of the Fifth Chancellor, sitting by designation, held that
Amendment right to an attorney during rental of the building did not require deterinterrogation would in no way be compro- mination that building was "held by way of

